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Summary. Control systems are rapidly evolving
to utilize modern computation and communication
tools, such as cloud computing and geographically
distributed networks, in order to improve perfor-
mance, coverage and scalability. However, control
loops that outsource the computation over privacy-
sensitive data to third-party platforms via public net-
works are already the subject of cyberattacks involv-
ing eavesdropping and data manipulation. Encrypted
control addresses this security gap and provides con-
fidentiality of the processed data in the entire control
loop, by encrypting the data at each level of transmis-
sion (over the network) and of computation (on cor-
rupted computing platforms). This paper presents a
tutorial-style introduction to this young but emerg-
ing field in the framework of secure control for net-
worked dynamical systems with encrypted data. We
focus on the steps of deriving the encrypted formu-
lations of some specific control algorithms from the
standard formulations and discuss the challenges aris-
ing in this process, ranging from privacy-aware con-
ceptualizations to changes in the computation flows
and quantization issues. In conclusion, we provide a
list of open problems and new directions to explore
in order to consolidate the area of encrypted control.
Cloud computing and distributed com-
puting are becoming ubiquitous in many
modern control systems such as smart grids,
building automation, robot swarms or intel-
ligent transportation systems. Compared
to “isolated” control systems, the advan-
tages of cloud-based and distributed control
systems are, in particular, resource pool-
ing and outsourcing, rapid scalability, and
high performance. However, these capabil-
ities do not come without risks. In fact,
the involved communication and processing
of sensitive data via public networks and
on third-party platforms promote, among
other cyberthreats, eavesdropping and ma-
nipulation of data. That these threats are
relevant to real-world applications is appar-
ent from an increasing number of cyberat-
tacks explicitly addressing industrial con-
trol systems [90]. Prominent examples are
the malwares Stuxnet, Duqu, Industroyer,
or Triton (see, e.g., [16]) as well as infer-
ence attacks arising from smart meters used
as surveillance devices (see, e.g. [60, 39]).
Clearly, cyberattacks on control systems can
be highly critical. In particular, unlike at-
tacks on classical IT systems, attacks on control systems may influence physical processes through
digital manipulations [88]. Moreover, networked control systems are the backbone of critical infras-
tructure such as electric power, transportation, and water distribution networks, with further appli-
cations illustrated in the sidebar “Prospective uses of encrypted control in industry”. Hence, future
control schemes should counteract privacy and security threats and ensure confidentiality, integrity,
and availability (see [11] or [88, Fig. S1] for details on these traditional security goals) of the involved
process data.
Secure control for networked systems has been intensively studied in the literature during the last
decade. Comprehensive surveys can be found in [15, 68, 51, 20] and in the special issue of the IEEE
Control Systems Magazin on “Cyberphysical Security” from 2015 (especially [88]). Two observations
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are particularly important for the scope of this paper. First, analogously to cyberattacks on IT systems,
there exists a variety of different attacks and tailored defense mechanisms. For instance, stealth, false-
data injection, replay, covert, and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks can be distinguished [68]. Second,
interdisciplinary solutions are required to secure control systems. In fact, standard information-
theoretic or cryptographic tools on their own are often not sufficient (see, e.g., [15, Sect. 3] or [95]).
Most existing works focus on the integrity and availability of networked control schemes using various
defense mechanisms. For example, control-related concepts such as detectability and identifiability
of deception attacks are investigated in [68]. Moreover, game-theoretic approaches to deal with DoS
attacks are, e.g., considered in [40, 55].
Prospective uses of encrypted control in industry.
Recent years saw the emergence of “Control-as-a-
Service” [37] with companies offering personalized opti-
mized control algorithms for a better power consumption
and economic efficiency. Encrypted control, which deals
with privately computing control decisions while process-
ing encrypted data, is an appealing solution to the types
of attacks mentioned in the Introduction. Control-as-a-
Service is mainly used in building automation and smart
grids, but took off also in automation systems for man-
ufacturing and chemical industries, food service, trans-
portation systems, water supply, and sewage waste main-
tenance. The inertia of such systems makes encrypted
control (which has an overhead compared to standard
control due to encryption) particularly amenable. Fur-
thermore, given the criticality of some of these indus-
trial systems, control schemes that simultaneously take
into account security, safety, and constraints, such as
encrypted model predictive control, are recommended.
Apart from these examples, lighter-weight distributed en-
crypted control could be adequate in exploration and
surveillance swarms of robots deployed in hazardous en-
vironments, where the capture of one robot that operates
an encrypted control scheme would not jeopardize the
other robots in the swarm.
The emerging field of encrypted con-
trol primarily aims for confidential-
ity of sensitive system states, con-
trol actions, controller parameters, or
model data in the entire control loop.
More generally, an encrypted con-
troller can be defined as a networked
control scheme that simultaneously en-
sures control performance and privacy
of the client system(s) through special-
ized cryptographic tools. In the frame-
work of networked control, attacks
compromising confidentiality such as
eavesdropping might seem less critical
since they do not immediately cause
physical misbehavior. However, “pas-
sive” spying often precedes “active” at-
tacks compromising data integrity and
availability (see, e.g., [20, Sect. III.A]).
Abstractly speaking, encrypted con-
trol is realized by modifying conven-
tional control schemes such that they
are capable of computing encrypted in-
puts based on encrypted states (or en-
crypted controller parameters) without
intermediate decryptions by the con-
troller. The basic concept is illustrated in Figure 1.(b) for a cloud-based controller. In this context,
it is important to note that encrypted control goes beyond secure communication channels as in Fig-
ure 1.(a) that could be realized using classical encryption, such as AES. In fact, encrypted control
additionally provides security against curious cloud providers or neighboring agents that, during con-
troller evaluations, would have access to unsecured data for solely secured communications. In this
context, the consideration of so-called honest-but-curious platforms is the key difference to existing
secure control schemes focusing on confidentiality (such as, e.g., [94, 54]) and it is part of the attack
model underlying most encrypted control schemes as specified in the sidebar “Security against what?
Security goals and attack models”. Meeting these privacy demands under real-time restrictions is
non-trivial and requires a co-design of controllers and suitable cryptosystems. In fact, identifying
controller formulations that can be efficiently combined with capable cryptosystems can be seen as
the central task for encrypted control and will be a recurring theme throughout this paper.
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Security against what? Security goals and attack models. In modern cryptography, the con-
cept of “security” is always related to a security goal and certain attacks. Roughly speaking, an
encryption scheme is considered secure against disclosure attacks if an attacker gets no new infor-
mation about a plaintext (i.e., the unencrypted data) from a ciphertext (i.e., the encrypted data)
– regardless of its previous knowledge [47, p. 19]. The knowledge and capabilities of an attacker
are the basis for the attack model. For example, one can distinguish between ciphertext-only
attacks, where the attacker just observes ciphertexts and attempts to obtain information about
the underlying plaintexts, and known-plaintext attacks, where the attacker has access to some
plaintext-ciphertext tuples [47, p. 20]. Further variants of the latter attack are chosen-plaintext
attacks, where the attacker gets access to ciphertexts for plaintexts of its choice, and chosen-
ciphertext attacks, where the attacker gets access to plaintexts for ciphertexts of its choice. We
next specify some popular security goals. In the framework of cryptography, the highest security
level is perfect secrecy [85]. Roughly speaking, a cryptosystem is called perfectly secret if the
probability distribution of the ciphertext does not depend on the plaintext (cf. [47, p. 29]). In
other words, the probability of one message to be the one encrypted is the same for all possible
messages in the space. The easiest way to specify this definition is to study a simple scheme that
is not perfectly secret. Consider, e.g., the substitution cipher in the table below and assume it
is used to encrypt an English text. In this example, the probability distribution of the plaintext
reflects the well-known average letter frequencies for English text (see, e.g., [47, Fig. 1.3]). Now,
due to the fixed substitutions, the frequencies of the ciphertexts depend on the plaintext. Hence,
the scheme (that is a generalization of Caesar’s cipher) is not perfectly secret. Perfect secrecy
against ciphertext-only attacks is, however, provided by the so-called one-time pad that is briefly
discussed in Section 1.
Plain a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z
Cipher E N C R Y P T G O L D F I S H M U Z A K B J Q V W X
As apparent from its definition, perfect secrecy is an information-theoretic concept. Hence, it
does not depend on the difficulty of some computational problems. In contrast, the security of
most homomorphic cryptosystems is called semantic security, which roughly means that the ci-
phertexts are computationally indistinguishable from each other, and builds on the hardness of
certain computational problems. For example, the semantic security of ElGamal [30] requires
that the discrete logarithm is difficult to compute (in the underlying group). Analogously, the
semantic security of Paillier [65] builds on the decisional composite residuosity assumption, which
is related to the hardness of factorization [47, p. 495]. For such schemes, it is natural to include
computational properties also in the security specification. In contrast to perfect secrecy, semantic
security specifies that some information about the plaintext can be extracted from the ciphertext.
However, the revealed information should either be negligible or extracting the information should
be computationally infeasible (see, e.g., [47, Def. 3.12] for a more specific definition). Under the
assumption that the underlying computational problems are hard, ElGamal and Paillier are both
semantically secure against chosen-plaintext attacks. Interestingly, due to their homomorphisms,
they are inherently not secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks. In encrypted control, we mainly
consider attacks that focus on disclosing secret information, e.g., through eavesdropping. We
further assume that attacks can occur during communication but also in the cloud(s) or at neigh-
boring agents. It is, however, assumed that these parties follow prescribed protocols. In other
words, the external parties honestly evaluate outsourced algorithms but they are curious about
the processed data. This attack model is known as honest-but-curious and it is standard in cryp-
tography (see, e.g., [31, Ch. 2]). In addition, honest-but-curious cloud providers are realistic, since
it is profitable for them to learn and use the private information of users, but it is extremely risky
for their business model to deviate from the a priori established protocols and be caught.
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Figure 1: Illustration of (a) a cloud-based control scheme with encrypted communications but insecure
controller evaluation and (b) a cloud-based control scheme with encrypted communications and encrypted
controller evaluation. Double-arrows and double-framing highlight encrypted data transmission and en-
crypted data processing, respectively.
Encrypted control was first realized in [52] for linear state feedback. Since then, a few dozen
papers have presented more efficient implementations and encrypted realizations of more complex
control schemes (see the sidebar “A brief survey on encrypted control” for details). The different
approaches can be classified based on controller type, system architecture, and applied cryptographic
techniques. So far, linear, model predictive, and distributed controllers have been implemented in
an encrypted fashion. Regarding the architecture, we can distinguish networked control systems
including one cloud, multiple (non-collaborating) clouds, or multiple agents (cf. Figs. 1, 2, and 4).
Concerning the cryptographic tools, solutions involving homomorphic encryption, secret sharing, and
hybrid methods that ensure secure multi-party computation have been proposed. Since the mentioned
cryptosystems may be new to many readers, we briefly summarize the underlying concepts before
giving formal descriptions further below. Homomorphic encryption (see, e.g., [30, 65, 36, 14]) refers to
a special family of cryptosystems that allow elementary mathematical operations (such as additions
or multiplications) to be carried out on encrypted data. Secret sharing [84] divides secret data into
multiple shares, such that individual shareholders learn nothing about the secret but the secret can
be reconstructed by combining a certain number of shares. Secure multi-party computation (see,
e.g., [97, 69]) provides protocols to perform computations on secret data, e.g., based on secret shares
and oblivious transfer.
A brief survey on encrypted control. Encrypted linear controllers, including linear-quadratic
(Gaussian) regulators, implemented in a single cloud using partially homomorphic encryption HE
have been proposed in [35, 52, 32, 33], [57, 18, 89, 61], leveled HE in [4] and fully HE in [48]. An
encrypted linear controller utilizing two clouds, secret sharing, and secure two-party computation
has recently been discussed in [79]. A homomorphically encrypted and authenticated linear control
has been proposed in [17] using labeled HE. Encrypted model predictive control (MPC) using a
single cloud and additively HE is addressed in [82, 80, 77]. Encrypted MPC using two clouds
and a combination of HE and secure multi-party computation are presented in [3, 5]. The private
Kalman filtering problem is considered in [38], where a solution involving secure multi-party
computation and HE is proposed. An encrypted controller for discrete event systems is investigated
in [34]. Finally, encrypted distributed control for multi-agent systems is considered in [50, 81,
6, 75]. An important side note is that of encrypted optimization, that can be further used to
design encrypted controllers, for example MPC. Works that have proposed schemes for solving
optimization problems on encrypted data include [87, 2, 58, 91]. The approaches in [50, 81, 75]
mainly build on additively HE whereas secure multi-party computation dominates in [6, 91].
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This article provides an illustrative introduction to the young but emerging field of encrypted
control for non-cryptographers. We discuss and unify the different types of existing encrypted con-
trollers, their architectures, and the underlying cryptographic tools. In particular, we summarize the
linear controllers in [52, 32, 79] that build on multiplicatively homomorphic encryption, additively
homomorphic encryption, and secure two-party computation, respectively. We further investigate the
encrypted model predictive controlles in [82, 80, 3] and the encrypted cooperative control schemes
in [81] and [6]. The selected works allow us to illustrate two core ingredients of encrypted controllers.
First, we present fundamental cryptographic tools that enable encrypted computations. Second, we
discuss reformulations of conventional control schemes that support the application of those tools. In
addition, we indicate current challenges in encrypted control arising from the presented works and
thus provide stimuli for future research. The outline of this article is as follows. We first provide
basics on homomorphic encryption, secret sharing, and multi-party computation. Afterwards, we dis-
cuss milestones of encrypted control based on realizations of linear, model predictive, and distributed
controllers. Finally, we point out current challenges and future trends in encrypted control.
1 Basics on homomorphic encryption, secret sharing,
and multi-party computation
In what follows, we call plaintext a piece of data that is unencrypted. Plaintexts can refer to both
decrypted data as well as data that is prepared for encryption, e.g., a quantized number. In a similar
manner, we call ciphertext an encrypted piece of data, that, without secret information such as the
private key, cannot be used to retrieve the plaintext that was encrypted.
Essentially, homomorphic encryption (HE) refers to a special family of cryptosystems that enables
mathematical operations to be carried out on encrypted data (see, e.g, [30, 65, 36, 14, 19]). Let z1
and z2 be two arbitrary numbers in the message space of the cryptosystem and denote by “Enc” and
“Dec” the encryption and decryption procedure, respectively. More precisely, we call a cryptosystem
multiplicatively homomorphic if there exists an operation “⊗” that allows the evaluation of encrypted
multiplications, i.e., the relation
z1 z2 = Dec (Enc(z1)⊗ Enc(z2)) (1)
holds. Analogously, cryptosystems are called additively homomorphic if an operation “⊕” exists such
that encrypted additions can be realized:
z1 + z2 = Dec (Enc(z1)⊕ Enc(z2)) . (2)
A popular multiplicatively HE scheme is the ElGamal cryptosystem [30]. Additively HE is often
implemented using Paillier (see [65] or the sidebar “Paillier encryption and its homomorphisms”).
Encryption schemes that are both additively and multiplicatively homomorphic are called fully ho-
momorphic. In principle, fully HE schemes can be used to encrypt arbitrary functions [36]. However,
fully HE is computationally highly demanding and currently not a competitive option for encrypted
control on power or memory constrained devices. Nevertheless, so-called somewhat or leveled fully
HE schemes (see, e.g., [14, 19]), that support a limited number of encrypted multiplications and (a
limited or unlimited number of) encrypted additions, have already been used for encrypted control
and may become more relevant in the future.
If multiple cloud servers or agents are involved in the control law evaluations, secret sharing combined
with other multi-party computation techniques are an option to realize encrypted control. Roughly
speaking, secret sharing allows to divide and recombine secret data in such a way that the individual
shares reveal no information about the secret [84]. More formally, a secret sharing scheme that splits
secret data into S ≥ 2 shares in such a way that at least L ∈ {2, . . . , S} shares are required to reconstruct
the secret is called an (L,S)-threshold scheme.
5
Paillier encryption and its homomorphisms. So far, the ma-
jority of encrypted controllers makes use of the Paillier cryp-
tosystem [65]. The standard realization of the scheme consid-
ers the additive group of integers modulo P , denoted as ZP , as
the message space, where P is the product of two large primes
p and q. For the purposes of this paper, it is convenient to
think of ZP as the set {0, . . . , P − 1} ⊂ N. During the key gen-
eration procedure, two large primes p, q ∈ [2`−1,2`] of the same
“length” ` ∈ N are selected and the public key is specified by
P = pq. The secret key, that is only known to the entity that
needs to decrypt the data, is computed as S = (p − 1)(q − 1).
Now, the encryption of a number z from ZP is realized by
Enc(z, r) ∶= (P + 1)zrP mod P 2, (3)
where r is randomly picked from Z∗P 2 , the multiplicative group
of integers modulo P 2. The resulting ciphertext c is likewise an
element of Z∗P 2 and the decryption is carried out by computing
Dec(c) ∶= (cS modP 2) − 1
P
µ mod P (4)
using the secret key S, where µ is the multplicative inverse of
S modulo P . It is easy to prove correctness of the scheme,
i.e., z = Dec(Enc(z, r)) for every z ∈ ZP and every r ∈ Z∗P 2 .
Semantic security of the Pallier scheme builds on the assump-
tion that the decisional composite residuosity problem (see,
e.g., [47, p. 495] for details) is hard to solve, which is currently
the case for large P (thousands of bits). Regarding homo-
morphisms, we can infer from (3) and (4) that the Paillier
cryptosystem is additively homomorphic. In fact, we have
z1 + z2 = Dec (Enc(z1, r1)Enc(z2, z2) mod P 2) (5)
for all z1, z2 ∈ ZP and all r1, r2 ∈ Z∗P 2 . At this point, we recall
that the messages are integers. Hence, multiplications z1z2
can be implemented as sums of the form
z1z2 = z1 + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + z1´udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¸udcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymodudcurlymod¶
z2-times
. (6)
Applying the homomorphism (5) repeatedly to the right-hand
side of (6) yields the relation
z1z2 = Dec (Enc(z1, r)z2 mod N2) (7)
that holds for all z1, z2 ∈ ZP and all r ∈ Z∗P 2 . Relation (7)
allows to implement partially encrypted multiplications with
one encrypted factor (here z1). This feature is an advantage
of additively homomorphic cryptosystems over multiplicatively
homomorphic schemes.
In the simplest case, S = 2
shareholders are involved, which
implies L = 2, i.e., the secret data
is split into two shares and both
shares are required to reconstruct
the secret. As an example, let
us assume the secret is an integer
z ∈ {0, . . . , ϕ − 1} for some user-
defined ϕ ∈ N with ϕ ≥ 2. Then,
a (2,2)-threshold scheme can be
realized as follows. An integer r ∈{0, . . . , ϕ − 1} is chosen uniformly
at random and the ciphertext
c ∶= z + r mod ϕ (8)
is computed, where mod refers to
the standard modulo operation.
The two numbers c and r can be
considered as two shares of the se-
cret z. In this context, it is easy
to see that neither c nor r reveal
any information on z. In fact, r is
a random number and c as in (8)
corresponds to the ciphertext of
a so-called one-time pad. Since
one-time pads are perfectly secure
(see [85] and the sidebar “Secu-
rity against what? Security goals
and attack models”), c reveals no
information on z apart from the
fact that z ∈ {0, . . . , ϕ − 1}. Nev-
ertheless, combining the shares c
and r allows one to reconstruct z
according to z = c − r mod ϕ.
Secure multi-party computa-
tion consists of a set of techniques
that involve the secure process-
ing of data between multiple mu-
tually distrusting parties [31]. A
secure multi-party computation
scheme can be realized by split-
ting the private data among mul-
tiple parties using secret sharing,
garbled circuits [8], or (threshold)
HE [22] and then jointly comput-
ing a mutually agreed upon func-
tion on their pieces of information
using hybrid versions between the
aforementioned tools. An exam-
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ple of a protocol essential to secure multi-party computation is (1-out-of-2) oblivious transfer. To
illustrate this protocol, consider a party that holds two numbers z0, z1 ∈ {0, . . . , ϕ − 1} and a second
party that has a bit τ ∈ {0,1}. The problem underlying oblivious transfer is to enable the second
party to obtain zτ without finding out the other number (i.e., z1−τ ) and without revealing τ to the
first party. There exist various implementations of oblivious transfer (see, e.g., [31, Ch. 3.7]). We next
present a simple realization based on additively HE that we will later use to implement an encrypted
model predictive controller. To prepare the oblivious transfer, the second party sets up a Paillier cryp-
tosystem by generating a public key used for encryption and homomorphic operations and a secret key
required for decryption (see the sidebar “Paillier encryption and its homomorphisms” for details). The
first party then generates two random numbers r0 and r1, computes z0 + r0 mod ϕ and z1 + r1 mod ϕ
according to (8), and sends the results to the second party. Based on its bit τ , the second party selects,
encrypts and sends back Enc(zτ + rτ mod ϕ) and Enc(τ). Next, the first party computes
c ∶= Enc(zτ + rτ mod ϕ)⊕ ((Enc(τ)⊕ Enc(−1)) ⊙ r0)⊕ (Enc(τ) ⊙ (−r1)) (9)
by exploiting (2) and another (related) homomorphism of the Paillier scheme that we denote with “⊙”.
In fact, as pointed out in the sidebar “Paillier encryption and its homomorphisms”, Paillier not only
offers (2) but also the relation (7) that enables multiplication between one encrypted factor and one
plaintext integer (i.e., Enc(z1)⊙z2). Afterwards, the first party returns the resulting ciphertext c to the
second party, which finally obtains zτ from evaluating Dec(c) mod ϕ using its secret key. Obviously,
zτ is correctly received since (9) actually implements
zτ + rτ mod ϕ + r0(τ − 1) − r1τ = zτ + rτ mod ϕ − rτ .
The privacy of the oblivious transfer follows from the security of the additively homomorphic cryp-
tosystem and the statistical security of the secret sharing scheme.
Software for encrypted computations and hardware acceleration. One of the goals of encrypted
computation is to provide a wide-range usage, which requires optimized code and versatility of
functions. To this end, there are several open-source software packages available. Regarding
partially homomorphic encryption (HE), a multiplicity of implementations exists due to their rel-
atively simple functionality. We exemplarily refer to python-paillier [26] that implements the
Paillier scheme, with the security caveat that the default encoding is a floating-point encoding
with public exponent. For fully HE, we mention the C++ libraries HElib [41], SEAL [83], and
PALISADE [66]. Due to the high complexity of the implemented schemes, these libraries require
expert users. However, they provide a large variety of capabilities. One important capability,
which can be decisive when judging the realizability of encrypted control, is the possibility of
effectuating the encrypted computations on native 64 bit arithmetic of current processors, rather
than expensive multiprecision arithmetic. We also refer to the following compilers for fully homo-
morphic cryptosystems [27, 12] that automate the choice of the best parameters for the runtime
and the best parallelization techniques. Various software tools are also available in the realm of se-
cure multi-party computation. They implement, e.g., garbled circuits, oblivious transfer schemes,
or secret-sharing protocols and they further allow to transform high-level code into these low-
level secure protocols. The paper [42] surveys these tools and comments on their usability and
availability.
We finally note that special hardware can achieve much better performance for some encrypted
computations than commodity hardware. In fact, by hardwiring specific computations in GPUs
and reconfigurable hardware such as FPGAs, a significant speed-up can be obtained. This path,
that is a research area on its own, is taken by a plethora of works such as [29, 70, 76, 21, 74, 72].
In the scope of this paper, a custom digital design for encrypted control on an FPGA that makes
use of hardware-optimized modular multiplications is proposed in [93].
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While the primer above presents basic functionalities of cryptosystems allowing encrypted compu-
tations, there are plenty of techniques in the literature that improve the efficiency and usability of
these tools. We survey relevant cryptographic software libraries and advantageous hardware in the
sidebar “Software for encrypted computations and hardware acceleration”.
We end this technical section with a visual analogy. Typical encryption schemes can be envisioned
as safe boxes, where a plaintext is stored safely and can be retrieved only by knowing the combination
code. On the other hand, a scheme that allows encrypted computations, such as the ones presented in
this section, can be viewed as a safe glovebox: one can manipulate the plaintext stored inside through
the gloves (through ciphertext manipulation), without the need of retrieving it outside of the box
using the combination code.
2 Encrypted linear control
As briefly discussed in the introduction, the first encrypted controllers implement linear control laws
of the form
u(k) =Kx(k), (10)
where K ∈ Rm×n. Such linear controllers are typically applied to linear (discrete-time) systems
x(k + 1) =Ax(k) +Bu(k) (11)
with A ∈ Rn×n and B ∈ Rn×m but, for the moment, the system dynamics are not of interest. The first
provably secure implementation of (10) was realized in [52] using the multiplicatively homomorphic
ElGamal scheme [30]. We briefly note that encrypted implementations of (10) were even proposed
slightly earlier in [35] (and also in [52]) using Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) encryption [73]. However,
these implementations build on the multiplicative homomorphism of the so-called “text-book” RSA
that is considered to be insecure (see, e.g., [47, p. 412]).
In the following, we summarize three existing realizations of encrypted linear control that build on
different cryptographic techniques. For completeness, we note that not only static linear controllers
as in (10) have been considered in the framework of encrypted control. In fact, a significant number
of works (e.g., [52, 48, 18, 89, 61]) focus on the encryption of linear dynamic controllers of the form
ξ(k + 1) =Aξ(k) +By(k), (12a)
u(k) = Cξ(k) +Dy(k), (12b)
where ξ(k) and y(k) ∶= Cx(k) +Du(k) refer to the controller state and the system’s output, respec-
tively. Nevertheless, encrypting (12) is significantly harder than (10) since iterating the controller
state in an encrypted fashion is more demanding as briefly explained in Section “5” further below.
We refer the interested reader to the original works for more details.
2.1 First implementation using ElGamal encryption
The encrypted implementation of (10) in [52] is based on the following two observations. First, the
control action can be computed based on the matrix
Φ(k) ∶= ⎛⎜⎝
K11x1(k) . . . K1nxn(k)⋮ ⋱ ⋮
Km1x1(k) . . . Kmnxn(k)
⎞⎟⎠ ∈ Rm×n (13)
that solely contains products of the controller parameters Kij and the states xj(k). In fact, ui(k) as
in (10) is obviously equivalent to
ui(k) = n∑
j=1Φij(k) (14)
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Forming integer messages from quantized data. Most
of the cryptosystems currently used for encrypted con-
trol offer integer messages spaces of finite size. Hence,
in order to encrypt system states and to securely
evaluate control laws, states and controller parameters
need to be mapped onto these message spaces. The
first step of this mapping is usually an element-wise
approximation of the real-valued states and parame-
ters with fixed-point numbers from the set Qβ,γ,δ ∶={−βγ ,−βγ + β−δ, . . . , βγ − 2β−δ, βγ − β−δ}, where β, γ, δ ∈ N
with β ≥ 1 can be understood as the basis, the mag-
nitude, and the resolution of the set, respectively. For
example, for β = 10 and γ = δ = 1, we obtain Qβ,γ,δ ={−10,−9.9, . . . ,9.8,9.9}. The actual quantization is real-
ized with a user-defined mapping g ∶ R → Qβ,γ,δ (e.g.,
rounding off or up) that provides fixed-point approxima-
tions of the form xˆ ∶= g(x). We do not further specify the
surjective mapping g apart from the restriction that
∣g(x) − x∣ ≤ β−δ for every x ∈ [−βγ , βγ]. (15)
In other words, the quantization error should be limited by
the resolution for real-valued data in the range of Qβ,γ,δ. It
remains to address the mapping from Qβ,γ,δ to a suitable
subset of the set of integers. In this context, the central
observation is that βδQβ,γ,δ ⊂ Z, i.e., scaling Qβ,γ,δ with
the factor βδ results in a subset of Z. Now, it is often
convenient to provide positive integers in a set of the form{0, . . . , ϕ − 1}, where ϕ is a user-defined parameter. This
can be realized based on the function f ∶ Z→ {0, . . . , ϕ−1}
with f(z) ∶= z mod ϕ. In fact, the combination of the
quantization via g, the scaling with βδ, and the mapping
f leads to f(βδg(x)) ∈ {0, . . . , ϕ − 1}. The resulting in-
tegers can then be encrypted and processed through ho-
momorphic operations. In this context, it is important
to note that additions and multiplications are structurally
preserved by scaling and the mapping f (see, e.g., [79,
Eq. (10)]). Hence, multiplicatively homomorphic ElGa-
mal and additively homomorphic Paillier can indeed be
utilized to implement (16) and (17), respectively. More-
over, the scaling and mapping can be (partially) inverted
and we refer to [79, Sect. II.C] for details on a partial
inverse of f . It is easy to see that inverting g, i.e., the
quantization, is generally not possible. Hence, we have to
deal with the corresponding quantization errors. As ap-
parent from (15), such errors can be reduced by increasing
β, γ, and δ. However, the cardinality of Qβ,γ,δ is simulta-
neously increased. Thus, when implementing an encrypted
controller, the user has to tune these parameters to ensure
a faithful quantization at a reasonable computation cost.
for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Second,
an encrypted cloud-based computa-
tion of (13) can be implemented us-
ing ElGamal. To this end, the cur-
rent state x(k) is measured and en-
crypted at the sensor. In the follow-
ing, we use the shorthand notation⟦⋅⟧ to highlight encrypted values. We
note that the notation is slightly in-
formal since it combines the mapping
of the data onto the message space
of the cryptosystem and the subse-
quent encryption without giving de-
tails on the actual implementation.
We briefly present a suitable proce-
dure in the sidebar “Forming integer
messages from quantized data” and
refer the interested reader to the re-
spective original works.
The resulting ciphertexts ⟦x(k)⟧
are then sent to the cloud, where the
mn products
⟦Φij(k)⟧ = ⟦Kij⟧⊗ ⟦xj(k)⟧ (16)
are evaluated in an encrypted fash-
ion using an multiplicative homomor-
phism of the form (1). The encrypted
control scheme is completed by trans-
mitting the encrypted matrix ⟦Φ(k)⟧
to the actuator, where it is decrypted
and where the control action is com-
puted according to (14).
In alignment with Figure 1, the
core of an encrypted controller is the
ability to compute encrypted control
actions based on encrypted system
states. Clearly, the previously sum-
marized scheme shows this character-
istic. The scheme additionally offers
an encryption of the controller param-
eters K as apparent from the com-
putation of ⟦Φ(k)⟧. The encrypted
computation of ⟦Φ(k)⟧ builds on the
multiplicative homomorphism of El-
Gamal. However, since ElGamal is
(originally) not additively homomor-
phic, summing up the various rows of
Φ(k) to obtain u(k) has to be car-
ried out at the actuator. As a conse-
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quence, the full matrix ⟦Φ(k)⟧, i.e., mn ciphertexts, have to be transmitted from the cloud to the
actuator. Taking into account that the original control scheme requires the transmission of only m
control inputs, the high communication load of the scheme becomes apparent. In addition, mn decryp-
tions are required at the actuator. Hence, this scheme also reveals more information to the actuator
than the required u(k). However, it is important to note that the control gain K remains private.
2.2 Alternative implementation using Paillier encryption
The high communication load and the high number of decryptions can be avoided by using the
additively homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem instead of the multiplicative homomorphic ElGamal
encryption. This observation was first made and implemented in [32]. As before, the proposed scheme
calls for encryptions of the system states at the sensor and the resulting ciphertexts ⟦x(k)⟧ are again
sent to the cloud. However, by exploiting the homomorphism (2) or, more precisely, (5) and (7), the
scheme directly computes encrypted inputs in the cloud via⟦ui(k)⟧ = (Ki1 ⊙ ⟦x1(k)⟧)⊕ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⊕ (Kin ⊙ ⟦xn(k)⟧) (17)
instead of the intermediate result ⟦Φ(k)⟧ as above. The encrypted inputs ⟦u(k)⟧ are then sent to the
actuator, where the decryption is carried out with the help of (4).
The presented encrypted controllers based on ElGamal and Paillier encryption, respectively, offer
many similarities. First, they both implement the same control law using HE. A second similarity
becomes apparent when analyzing the intermediate results ⟦Ψij(k)⟧ ∶=Kij ⊙ ⟦xj(k)⟧ in (17). In fact,
decrypting the corresponding ciphertext matrix ⟦Φ(k)⟧ would result in the same plaintext matrix as
the decryption of ⟦Ψ(k)⟧ from (16). The two schemes differ, however, in terms of the pre- and post-
processing of intermediate results. In contrast to ⟦Φ(k)⟧, ⟦Ψ(k)⟧ is computed without encrypting K
which, eventually, allows to determine ⟦u(k)⟧ in the cloud. As a consequence, the communication load
and the amount of required decryptions at the actuator are reduced. Hence, if encrypting K is not
required, encrypted linear control can be more efficiently implemented using Paillier. Nevertheless,
implementing encrypted control using any homomorphic cryptosystem is numerically demanding. This
is apparent from Table 1 that lists computation times and operation counts for encryptions, encrypted
operations, and decryptions using the ElGamal and Paillier cryptosystem, respectively. Ultimately,
the comparison between the two implementations points out the important trade-off between privacy
and efficiency: concealing more information, such as both the control gains and system states, incurs
more communication cost than concealing only the states.
Table 1: Computation times (in milliseconds) for a single encryption, encrypted operation, or decryption
using the ElGamal or Paillier cryptosystem, respectively, with different (public) key lengths. The listed
times reflect average run times for Python procedures running on a 2.7 GHz Intel Core i7-7500U. The
ElGamal encryption has been implemented according to [47, pp. 400-401]. The listed periods of usage for
the different keys reflect the recommendations [62] of the US National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST). The last row summarizes the operation counts for the encrypted linear controllers for systems with
n states and m control inputs.
Key length Usage ElGamal Paillier
(recommended) Enc Mul Dec Enc MulByC Add Dec
1024 outdated 1.065 0.023 0.963 1.523 0.017 0.021 0.412
2048 2016–2030 6.191 0.024 5.828 10.511 0.055 0.064 2.887
3072 beyond 2030 19.633 0.031 18.132 28.731 0.082 0.118 9.540
Operation count n mn mn n mn m(n − 1) m
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2.3 Efficient implementation using secret sharing
The computational effort can be significantly reduced if tailored controller architectures and crypto-
graphic tools are considered. As an illustrative example, we consider the encrypted linear controller
in [79] that is based on secret sharing and two-party computation. At the sensor, the current state
x(k) is measured, a random manipulation r(k) is generated, and the shares x(1)(k) ∶= x(k)+r(k) and
x(2)(k) ∶= r(k) are specified. These shares are then sent to two non-colluding clouds (e.g., operated
by two different cloud providers). There, the linear control law (10) is evaluated for the respective
share by computing
v(1)(k) ∶=Kx(1)(k) and v(2)(k) ∶=Kx(2)(k),
respectively. The resulting values v(1)(k) and v(2)(k) are independently transmitted to the actuator,
where the control action is determined as u(k) = v(1)(k) − v(2)(k). Since the manipulation r(k) is
newly generated in each time step k, the individual shares x(1)(k) and x(2)(k) contain no information
on the actual state x(k) (if some additional technicalities are considered). Likewise, v(1)(k) and
v(2)(k) contain no information on u(k).
The actual implementation in [79] is based on one-time pads (that have been summarized above)
and, similar to the implementations using homomorphic encryption, involves quantization of the states
and controller parameters. It is important to understand the role of the two clouds. In this context,
we first note that involving two clouds that are not collaborating is realistic. Nevertheless, we need
to guarantee that the first cloud has no access to the information transmitted to and from the second
cloud and vice versa. Fortunately, this can be easily realized by establishing secure communication
channels using standard symmetric encryption schemes (such as the advanced encryption standard
(AES) [24]). The resulting scheme is illustrated in Figure 2.(a). Computation-wise, it is significantly
more efficient than the previously discussed schemes since demanding asymmetric (i.e., public key)
encryption and encrypted operations are not required. In fact, the needed symmetric encryption is
relatively cheap. For instance, an AES encryption (and decryption) with a 128-bit key (that offers a
security level comparable to the 3072-bit keys in Tab. 1) requires less than a microsecond. As in the
case of the solution involving the Paillier scheme, this solution considers public control gains.
(a) Two-party computation without data exchange
Actuator
u
System
x
Sensor
Controller
1st share
v1 x1
Controller
2nd share
v2 x2
(b) Two-party computation with data exchange
Actuator
u
System
x
Sensor
Encrypted affine operations
Encrypted projections
BζjG, BzminG, BzmaxGBz
jG
Abbildung 3: Illustration.
(a) Encrypted communication between agents
Agent1 Agent2
Agent3
Agent4
x1, x2
x2, x3
x3, x4x2, x4
Sensor
System
Actuator
Sender
Receiver
Controller
x2
u2
x2
x1, x3, x4
(b) Encrypted control of agents
Agent1 Agent2
Agent3
Agent4
v21, v12
v32, v23
v43, v34v42, v24
Sensor
System
Actuator
Control
shares &
Sender
Receiver &
Controller
x2
u2
K12, K32, K42
v12, v32, v42
v21, v23, v24
Abbildung 4: Illustration.
2
Figure 2: Illustration of (a) an encrypted control scheme based on two-party computation without data
exchange between the clouds and (b) the encrypted implementation of a projected gradient scheme based
on two non-colluding clouds with encrypted data exchange.
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3 Encrypted model predictive control
Encrypted linear controllers serve as an intuitive proof of concept for encrypted control. The previously
discussed schemes illustrate that encrypted cloud-based control can be realized “naturally” using
existing cryptographic tools. However, cloud-based implementations of linear control laws are of
limited use for real-world applications. Indeed, using cloud services is more useful for numerically
demanding control strategies such as optimization-based control. A popular control scheme that
involves optimization is model predictive control (MPC). MPC for linear systems (11) typically builds
on solving an optimal control problem (OCP) of the form
V (x) ∶= min
x˜(0),...,x˜(N)
u˜(0),...,u˜(N−1)
x˜(N)⊺P x˜(N) + N−1∑
κ=0 x˜(κ)⊺Qx˜(κ) + u˜(κ)⊺Ru˜(κ) (18)
s.t. x˜(0) = x,
x˜(κ + 1) =Ax˜(κ) +Bu˜(κ), ∀κ ∈ {0, . . . ,N − 1}
x˜(κ) ∈ X , ∀κ ∈ {0, . . . ,N − 1}
u˜(κ) ∈ U , ∀κ ∈ {0, . . . ,N − 1}
x˜(N) ∈ T
in every time step for the current state x = x(k). The OCP is characterized by the following param-
eters. The integer N refers to the prediction horizon. The weighting matrices P ∈ Rn×n, Q ∈ Rn×n,
and R ∈ Rm×m specify the control objective. The sets X ⊆ Rn and U ⊆ Rm describe state and input
constraints of the system, respectively. Finally, the terminal set T ⊆ X can be used to enforce stability
of the closed-loop system and recursive feasibility of the MPC (see [59, Sect. 3.3] for details). In this
context, the closed-loop dynamics are determined by the feedback
u(k) = u˜∗(0), (19)
where u˜∗(0), . . . , u˜∗(N − 1), x˜∗(0), . . . , x˜∗(N) refer to the optimizers for (18). For simplicity, we
assume throughout the paper that P , Q, and R are positive definite and that X , U , and T are
convex polyhedrons. Under these assumptions, (18) is a strictly convex quadratic program (QP) with
a unique optimizer. Implementing MPC requires to solve this QP in every time step. Depending on
the size of m, n, and N and the number of hyperplanes describing X , U , and T , solving (18) can be
numerically demanding and a cloud-solution becomes beneficial. Hence, encrypted cloud-based MPC
offers interesting applications.
3.1 First implementation using offline optimization
The first encrypted MPC was introduced in [82]. The proposed implementation builds on the three
following observations. First, the OCP (18) can be rewritten as a QP of the form
z∗(x) = arg min
z
1
2
z⊺Hz +x⊺F ⊺z (20)
s.t. Gz ≤ Ex +h
with the decision variables
z ∶= ⎛⎜⎝
u˜(0)⋮
u˜(N − 1)
⎞⎟⎠ ∈ RNm (21)
and the parameters x = x(k), where we refer to [9, Sect. 2.1] for details on the computation of the
vector h and the matrices E, F , G, and H. Second, the parametrized solution of (20) is known to
12
offer a certain structure. In fact, the optimizer z∗(x) is a piecewise affine function of the parameter
x. Since we have
u(k) = Cz∗(x(k)) with C ∶= (Im 0) ∈ Rm×Nm (22)
according to (19), the feedback becomes likewise a piecewise affine function of the form
u(k) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
K(1)x(k) + b(1) if x(k) ∈ P(1),⋮ ⋮
K(s)x(k) + b(s) if x(k) ∈ P(s). (23)
The individual affine segments are specified by the matrices K(σ) ∈ Rm×n, the vectors b(σ) ∈ Rm, and
the polyhedra P(σ) ⊆ X . The number of segments s is limited by the (typically conservative) upper
bound 2ϑ (see [9, Sect. 4.4]), where ϑ refers to the number of inequalities in (21). Third, for moderate
sizes of m, N , and ϑ, the parametersK(σ), b(σ), and P(σ) in (23) can actually be computed offline, i.e.,
before runtime of the controller. A suitable procedure, which can be understood as a multi-parametric
active-set solver, is described in [9, Sect. 4.3]. Now, based on (23), one can implement MPC without
online optimization. Computing the control action u(k) is then (typically) realized by a two-stage
procedure. First, the polyhedron P(σ) that contains the current state x(k) is identified. Second, the
corresponding affine segment is evaluated.
It easy to see that the second step of the procedure can be implemented in an encrypted fashion.
In fact, given the active segment in terms of the index σ, one can compute
⟦u(k)⟧ = (K(σ) ⊙ ⟦x(k)⟧)⊕ ⟦b(σ)⟧ (24)
analogously to (17) using Paillier. Here, with a slight abuse of notation, we extend the homomorphic
operations “⊙” and “⊕” to matrix-vector products and vector additions, respectively. We stress,
in this context, that evaluating K(σ) ⊙ ⟦x(k)⟧ also involves homomorphic additions (for n > 1) as
apparent from (17). Hence, an encrypted MPC can be realized as follows. At the sensor, the current
state x(k) is measured and the corresponding P(σ) is identified. Afterwards, x(k) is encrypted and⟦x(k)⟧ is sent to the cloud together with the index σ. In the cloud, ⟦u(k)⟧ is computed according to
(24) and transmitted to the actuator. There, ⟦u(k)⟧ is decrypted and u(k) applied. The resulting
encrypted MPC is illustrated in Figure 3.(a). We briefly note that robust MPC provides an effective
way to deal with the quantization errors that appear during the preparation of (23) for the encrypted
implementation in (24) (see the sidebar “Forming integer messages from quantized data” for details).
In fact, instead of the “nominal” OCP in (18), one can consider the OCP underlying tube-based
robust MPC and design the disturbance set such that it covers appearing quantization errors. Since
the resulting OCP can again be rewritten as an QP of the form (20), an encrypted implementation
can be realized analogously to the scheme presented here (see [82, Sect. III] for details).
We conclude the presentation of the scheme with a brief discussion of the information avail-
able to the cloud. Obviously, the clouds obtains the plaintexts K(1), . . . ,K(s) and the ciphertexts⟦b(1)⟧, . . . , ⟦b(s)⟧. During runtime, the cloud additionally gets access to the current index σ and ac-
cordingly selects the segment to be evaluated. In principle, knowing σ could allow an intruder to
narrow x(k) down to P(σ). However, the cloud has no direct access to the polyhedrons P(1), . . . ,P(s).
Moreover, under the (realistic) assumption that the cloud has no information on the parameters of
the OCP (18), it seems hard to reconstruct P(σ) from knowledge of K(1), . . . ,K(s). Nonetheless, if
knowledge of σ to the cloud is considered insecure, the sensor sends σ to the actuator and not to the
cloud (see Fig. 3.(a) for an illustration). Since the cloud has no information on the active segment, it
has to evaluate (24) for all σ ∈ {1, . . . , s} and it has to transmit all resulting ⟦u(k)⟧ to the actuator.
There, only the ciphertexts corresponding to segment σ are decrypted and applied. Comparing both
variants, the latter offers more security. However, it is also less efficient since the computation effort
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Abbildung 2: Illustration.Figure 3: Illustration of encrypted MPC implementations based on (a) the parametric offline solution of
the underlying optimal control problem and (b) real-time iterations of a projected gradient scheme.
in the cloud and the communication load to the actuator are significantly increased. Apart from
that, both variants share a common drawback. In fact, they both require P(σ) to be identified at
the sensor. There exist efficient algorithms for localizing P(σ) that, for example, make use of binary
search trees [92]. Nevertheless, neglecting encrypted operations for the moment, identifying P(σ) is
significantly more demanding than evaluating the corresponding affine controller segment. In sum-
mary, both variants of the proposed scheme show that encrypted cloud-based MPC can be realized.
However, the scheme is only applicable for moderate m, N , and ϑ. Moreover, the computational effort
at the sensor is high.
3.2 Online optimization using real-time iterations
The drawbacks of the previous scheme can be avoided by considering online optimization instead of
evaluating (23) offline. Several methods for solving QPs online exist. Examples include interior-point
methods, active-set procedures, and proximal algorithms (see, e.g., [67]). The various solvers have
in common that they iteratively approach the optimal solution. We next summarize the encrypted
MPC in [80] that builds on a projected gradient scheme (PGS), i.e., a structurally simple proximal
algorithm. In order to apply the scheme, we introduce the set
Z(x) ∶= {z ∈ RmN ∣Gz ≤ Ex +h}
that reflects the state-dependent constraints in (20). Then, a (primal) projected gradient descent can
be realized by recurrently evaluating the iterations
z(j+1) ∶= projZ (z(j) − ρ (Hz(j) +Fx)) , (25)
where Hz +Fx is the gradient of the objective in (20), where ρ is the step size, and where projZ(⋅)
denotes a projection onto Z(x). The choice of the parameter ρ affects the convergence (or divergence)
of the scheme. Convergence of the iterates z(j) to the optimizer z∗(x) is guaranteed for every ρ ∈(0,2λ−1max(H)) [64], where λmax(H) refers to the largest eigenvalue of the positive definite Hessian
H. Using the iterations (25) to solve (20) is only reasonable if the projection onto Z(x) can be
evaluated efficiently. This is, for example, the case if only box-shaped input constraints are present.
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More precisely, this special case is characterized by
X = T = Rn and U = {u ∈ Rm ∣umin ≤ u ≤ umax}, (26)
where umin,umax ∈ Rm reflect lower and upper bounds for the inputs, respectively. Under this as-
sumption, we obtain Z(x) = {z ∈ RmN ∣zmin ≤ z ≤ zmax } with
zmin ∶= ⎛⎜⎝
umin⋮
umin
⎞⎟⎠ ∈ RNm and zmax ∶=
⎛⎜⎝
umax⋮
umax
⎞⎟⎠ ∈ RNm.
The projection then yields (27), which can, at least in plaintext, be efficiently evaluated.
projZ(ζ) = min{max{zmin,ζ},zmax} . (27)
Regarding the encrypted implementation, even the simplified projection remains demanding. In
contrast, the computation of the projection’s argument ζ ∶= (INm − ρH)z(j) − ρFx in (25) can be
easily encrypted analogously to the Paillier-based linear scheme. This observation motivates the
encrypted control scheme proposed in [80]. In this scheme, only a single solver iteration is evaluated
per time step. More precisely, at step k, the cloud evaluates
⟦ζ(k)⟧ = ((INm − ρH) ⊙ ⟦z(0)(k)⟧)⊕ ((−ρF ) ⊙ ⟦x(k)⟧) (28)
based on encrypted states ⟦x(k)⟧ and an encrypted initial guess ⟦z(0)(k)⟧ using the Paillier ho-
momorphisms. The cloud then sends ⟦ζ(k)⟧ to the actuator, where it is decrypted and where the
projection (27) is evaluated to obtain z(1)(k) = projZ(ζ(k)). Finally, the input u(k) = Cz(1)(k) is
applied analogously to (22). It remains to comment on the initial guess z(0)(k). The scheme in [96,
Sect. IV.A] suggests to reuse z(1)(k) to initialize z(0)(k+1). More precisely, z(1)(k) is forwarded from
the actuator to the sensor, buffered, and then used to warmstart
z(0)(k + 1) =Dz(1)(k) (29)
at the following sampling instance, where D ∈ RNm×Nm is a user-defined update matrix. At step k,
the sensor sends the encrypted initial guess ⟦z(0)(k)⟧ to the cloud along with ⟦x(k)⟧. An illustration
of the resulting encrypted controller is given in Figure 3.(b).
From a computational point of view, the previously described scheme is viable. However, from
an optimal control perspective, the scheme seems questionable. Surprisingly, the coupling of solver
iterations and sampling instances can perform well. The resulting real-time iterations work particularly
well for MPC since the underlying OCPs for consecutive time steps are often very similar. The good
performance and certain stability certificates have even been proven analytically in [96, Sect. IV].
Clearly, the idea of encrypted real-time iterations can also be extended to solvers that can handle
more complicated constraints than (26), including state constraints. For instance, encrypted real-
time iterations of the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) are considered in [77,
Chap. 11.5]. Interestingly, the encrypted ADMM scheme involves encrypted updates of dual variables
(or Lagrange multipliers) in the cloud, which causes the same issues as the encrypted realization of
the dynamical controller in (12). This relation is, however, not surprising since proximal algorithms
such as PGS or ADMM can often be interpreted as dynamical controllers.
3.3 Online optimization using multi-party computation
Focusing on the computations (28) carried out in the cloud, the encrypted real-time iterations can
be interpreted as encrypted linear control for an augmented system state (consisting of x and z(0)).
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Hence, the utility of the cloud is again questionable. Moreover, real-time iterations may be stabilizing
but they are often suboptimal. Both drawbacks can be compensated with the encrypted MPC proposed
in [3]. In fact, [3] presents a scheme based on two non-colluding clouds (illustrated in Fig. 2.(b)) that
allows to evaluate multiple projected gradient iterations per time-step in an encrypted fashion. Thus,
the computational load in the cloud(s) is increased, while the sensor and the actuator only handle
the necessary encryption and decryption of data, respectively. In addition, multiple solver iterations
generally increase the accuracy of the approximations. Convergence to the optimum z∗(x) is further
improved in [3] by implementing a fast gradient method. However, for simplicity, we next present the
central ingredients of the scheme for the PGS considered above.
Following the concept in [3], the encryption of the PGS iterations (25) can be realized as follows.
The first cloud (or server) is concerned with the encrypted evaluation of the affine argument of the
projection. Hence, it computes
⟦ζ(j+1)(k)⟧(2) = ((I − ρH) ⊙ ⟦z(j)(k)⟧(2))⊕ ((−ρF ) ⊙ ⟦x(k)⟧(2))
analogously to (28), where it makes use of an additively homomorphic cryptosystem that has been set
up by the second cloud as indicated by the superscript “(2)”. Hence, the second cloud provides the
public key allowing encryption and homomorphic operations and it holds the secret key required for
decryption. Now, in order to complete an iteration j, one needs to perform the projection z(j+1)(k) =
projZ (ζ(j+1)(k)) in an encrypted manner. According to (27), the projection onto the box-constraintsZ can be separated into the two steps
ζ
(j+1)(k) ∶= max{zmin,ζ(j+1)(k)} and (30a)
z(j+1)(k) = min{ζ(j+1)(k),zmax}. (30b)
We explain the encrypted evaluation of (30a) and omit the analogous handling of (30b). The procedure
to be presented makes use of a protocol for private comparison (see [25] for details) that we briefly
summarize in the following. In this context, consider a party that holds two ciphertexts ⟦z0⟧ and ⟦z1⟧
encrypted with an additively homomorphic cryptosystem set up by a second party. As detailed in [5,
Sect. 9.4.5], private comparison then allows the second party to learn a bit τ satisfying zτ = max{z0, z1}
without revealing τ to the first party or the plaintexts z0 and z1 to any of the two parties. Using this
protocol, the encrypted evaluation of (30a) can be realized within five steps:
1. The first cloud encrypts zmin using the public key from the second cloud (or receives ⟦zmin⟧(2)
from the sensor) and randomly assigns the elements ⟦ζ(j+1)i (k)⟧(2) and ⟦zmin,i⟧(2) to ⟦ai⟧(2) and⟦bi⟧(2) in order to mask their order.
2. The two clouds run a private comparison protocol on ⟦a⟧(2) and ⟦b⟧(2) that provides a vector
τ ∈ {0,1}Nm (such that τ i = 1 whenever ai ≤ bi) to the second cloud.
3. The first cloud generates random vectors r and s and masks ⟦a⟧(2) and ⟦b⟧(2) by computing⟦a⟧(2)⊕ ⟦r⟧(2) and ⟦b⟧(2)⊕ ⟦s⟧(2). The resulting ciphertexts ⟦a+r⟧(2) and ⟦b+s⟧(2) are sent to
the second cloud.
4. The second cloud defines ⟦ci⟧(2) as ⟦ai + ri⟧(2) ⊕ ⟦0⟧(2) whenever τ i = 0 and ⟦bi + si⟧(2) ⊕ ⟦0⟧(2)
otherwise, where the addition of ⟦0⟧(2) implies a refreshment of the encryption. The ciphertexts⟦c⟧(2) are then returned to the first cloud together with ⟦τ ⟧(2).
5. The first cloud computes for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,Nm}
⟦ζ(j+1)i (k)⟧(2) = ⟦ci⟧(2) ⊕ (ri ⊙ (⟦τ i⟧(2))⊕ ⟦−1⟧(2))⊕ ((−si) ⊙ ⟦τ i⟧(2)) . (31)
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The three last steps represent a variant of the oblivious transfer introduced in the “Basics” section.
In particular, (31) is a variant of (9). The computation of ⟦z(j+1)(k)⟧(2) based on ⟦ζ(j+1)(k)⟧(2)
and ⟦zmax⟧(2) can be realized analogously. After evaluating J ≥ 1 iterations, the first cloud holds⟦z(J)(k)⟧(2), i.e., an encrypted approximation of z∗(x(k)). In order to provide u(k) = Cz(J)(k) to
the actuator, the encryption has to be changed from ⟦⋅⟧(2) to ⟦⋅⟧(act), where the superscript “(act)”
stands for a cryptosystem set up by the actuator (or the system operator). The standard way for
the first cloud to obtain ⟦u(k)⟧(act) from ⟦u(k)⟧(2) is to send to the second cloud a masked version⟦u(k)+ t⟧(2). The second cloud uses its secret key to decrypt, and then the public key of the actuator
to encrypt ⟦u(k) + t⟧(act). The first cloud then subtracts the mask to obtain the desired value:⟦u(k)⟧(act) = ⟦u(k) + t⟧(act) ⊕ ⟦−t⟧(act).
It remains to comment on the performance of the scheme. First of all, due to the multiple solver
iterations, the scheme usually performs better than the previously presented controller based on real-
time iterations. However, multiple iterations may also increase the effect of quantization errors as
specified in [3, Sect. VI]. Still, robustness can be guaranteed for a suitable design of the quantization.
Regarding the computational effort of the scheme, we note that the communication load is substantial,
in particular for the comparison protocol in step 2). In fact, let l be the number of bits required to
represent ⟦a⟧(2) (or ⟦b⟧(2)), then the necessary communication rounds between the two clouds are of
order l per solver iteration.
4 Encrypted distributed control
So far, the paper has focused on centralized cloud-based controllers. For many large-scale applications,
centralized control strategies are not tractable. For such systems, distributed control schemes are often
the method of choice. Distributed control is particularly useful if the system of interest consists of
numerous subsystems with local actuating and sensing elements. In the simplest case, the M ∈ N
subsystems show linear dynamics of the form
x(i)(k + 1) =A(ii)x(i)(k) +B(i)u(i)(k) + M∑
j=1,i≠jA(ij)x(j)(k),
where A(ii) ∈ Rni×ni and B(i) ∈ Rni×mi express local dynamics and where the various A(ij) ∈ Rni×nj
(for i ≠ j) represent physical couplings between the subsystems. Importantly, distributed control
usually aims for a common control goal, e.g., a constant power frequency in a smart grid. Realizing
such a goal through local control actions u(i) requires cooperation and hence communication between
the agents. In this context, an agent represents one subsystem and the corresponding local sensor,
control, and actuator (see Fig. 4). In general, communication will not take place between every
pair of agents. In fact, the graph describing the communication network is usually incomplete. We
assume that all communication links are bidirectional and that every pair of agents can, in principle,
interchange information through a direct link or via other agents. In addition, we assume that no
parallel links exist. In other words, we consider a communication graph that is undirected, connected,
and simple. More formally, the communication graph G(V,E) is characterized as follows. The vertex
set V ∶= {1, . . . ,M} and the edge set E ⊂ V × V represent the M agents and the communication links
between them, respectively. If (i, j) ∈ E then the agents i and j (with i ≠ j) are communicating with
each other and called neighbors. The set Ni ∶= {j ∈ V ∣ (i, j) ∈ E} collects all neighbors of agent i. The
bidirectionality of the communication then implies i ∈ Nj whenever j ∈ Ni (for all (i, j) ∈ E).
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4.1 Cooperative control using sparse feedback
Any cooperative control scheme has to comply with the communication network. In this context, a
structurally simple approach is a sparse linear control scheme of the form
⎛⎜⎝
u(1)(k)⋮
u(M)(k)
⎞⎟⎠ =
⎛⎜⎜⎝
K(11) . . . K(1M)⋮ ⋱ ⋮
K(M1) . . . K(MM)
⎞⎟⎟⎠
⎛⎜⎝
x(1)(k)⋮
x(M)(k)
⎞⎟⎠ , (32)
where the off-diagonal block matrices K(ij) ∈ Rmi×nj are zero matrices whenever j ∉ Ni, i.e., whenever
no communication link exists. The local controllers can then be written as
u(i)(k) =K(ii)x(i)(k) + ∑
j∈NiK
(ij)x(j)(k). (33)
While structurally simple, designing such distributed controllers is not trivial and we refer to [56] for
details on tailored optimization-based design procedures. As requested, evaluating u(i)(k) according
to (33) requires only information on the local state x(i)(k) and neighboring states x(j)(k). Typically,
information on neighboring agents is provided by directly communicating the states x(j)(k) between
the agents. This can be a security threat, if the local state information is sensitive and if neighboring
agents are curious about this data.
4.2 Encrypted cooperative control
Encrypted control allows to overcome this threat and to ensure confidentiality of the local states. In
the following, we briefly summarize the implementation proposed in [81]. We note that encrypted
cooperative control was previously realized in [33, Sect. 4] for a randomized control scheme. The first
step of the procedure in [81] does not involve any encryption. In fact, it simply proposes to compute
the “control shares”
v(ij)(k) ∶=K(ij)x(j)(k) (34)
at agent j and to communicate v(ij)(k) instead of x(j)(k). At agent i, the control action is then
computed via
u(i)(k) =K(ii)x(i)(k) + ∑
j∈Ni v
(ij)(k). (35)
instead of (33). This small modification already hides the local states x(j)(k) from agent i. Indeed,
without any information on K(ij) and x(j)(k) (including the dimension nj) it is hard to reconstruct
x(j)(k) from v(ij)(k). Moreover, even if information on K(ij) is available to or can be reconstructed
by agent i, retrieving x(j)(k) leads to an observability problem that requires further information on
A(jj), B(j), and u(j)(k) (see [6, Sect. VI] for details). The downside of the proposed modification is
that agent j would get access to the matrix K(ij) and the control shares v(ij)(k). Both quantities
could disclose information on the control strategy of the neighboring agent i, which could likewise be
a security threat. This threat can, however, be eliminated using HE. To see this, we first note that the
computation of the control shares (34) is very similar to the evaluation of the linear controller (10).
Hence, an encrypted computation of v(ij)(k) can be realized by evaluating
⟦v(ij)(k)⟧(i) = ⟦K(ij)⟧(i) ⊙ x(j)(k) (36)
using additively HE similarly to (17), where the superscript “(i)” indicates that the public key of agent
i is used for encryption. As a consequence, multiple cryptosystems are applied simultaneously and we
specify their interaction shortly. For the moment, we just point out that ⟦K(ij)⟧(i) will be provided
to agent j before runtime by some trustworthy entity (and not by agent i). Now, comparing (17) and
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(36), we note that the two implementations differ in terms of the partially encrypted multiplications
of the controller parameters and the system states. More precisely, in (36), the controller parameters
are encrypted and the states are plaintexts whereas the roles are swapped in (17). Nevertheless, both
variants can be realized using an homomorphism of the form (7). The differences between (17) and
(36) reflect slightly different setups. In fact, (17) is evaluated in the cloud which should not obtain
any information on the system states. In contrast, (36) is computed at agent j who should not get
access to K(ij) (and who necessarily measures x(j) in plaintext). However, both setups coincide in
that neither the cloud nor the agent should get information on the computed control actions or shares,
respectively.
As briefly mentioned above, ⟦⋅⟧(i) stands for encryption with the public key of agent i. As a con-
sequence, only agent i is capable of decrypting ⟦v(ij)(k)⟧(i) and, in principle, ⟦K(ij)⟧(i), using its
secret key. Since the multi-agent system consists of M agents, M cryptosystems are in use simultane-
ously. They are generated before runtime by the individual agents along with the corresponding secret
keys. While the latter are kept private, the public keys are broadcast between the agents. Another
item that has to be generated before runtime is the (sparse) control law (32). The corresponding
procedure in [56] requires a centralized design. The resulting block matrices K(ij) contain sensitive
information. In fact, agent j knowing K(ij) would render the encrypted computation (36) useless
since computing v(ij)(k) in plaintext would then be trivial for agent j. To overcome this issue, we
assume that the centralized controller design is carried out by some trustworthy entity, e.g., a system
operator. After computing the block matrices K(ij), this entity repeats the following two steps for
every agent i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. First, it sends K(ii) to agent i using a secure channel. Second, for every
neighbor j ∈ Ni, it encrypts K(ij) using the public key of agent i and sends the result ⟦K(ij)⟧(i) to
agent j. During runtime, every agent runs data dissemination and assimilation phases in every time
step k. During the data dissemination phase, every agent j initially measures its own state x(j). It
then computes the encrypted control shares ⟦v(ij)(k)⟧(i) according to (36) for every i ∈ Nj and sends
the result to the neighbor i. During the assimilation phase, every agent i first receives ⟦v(ij)(k)⟧(i)
from all the neighbors j ∈ Ni. It then decrypts the shares using its secret key and computes the local
control action according to (35). The resulting encrypted cooperative control scheme is illustrated in
Figure 4.(b).
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(a) Encrypted communication between agents
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Figure 4: Illustration of (a) a cooperative multi-agent system with encrypted communications and (b) a
multi-agent system operated by an encrypted cooperative control scheme. In (b), control shares v(ij) =
K(ij)x(j) are computed, encrypted, and communicated instead of the classical exchange of neighboring
states x(j) as in (a).
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4.3 Improving security
The key challenge in encrypted cooperative control is to ensure privacy of the local state x(j)(k) while
being required to compute (33), i.e., the control action of the neighboring agent i. Providing v(ij)(k)
instead of x(j)(k) to agent i without revealing v(ij)(k) or K(ij) to agent j is a significant step towards
a solution to this challenge. However, depending on the available information about the networked
control system, it might be possible for agent i to reconstruct x(j)(k) from v(ij)(k) and data from
previous time steps. In principle, there is an obvious way to render the reconstruction problem more
difficult. In fact, providing the aggregated share
w(i)(k) ∶= ∑
j∈Ni v
(ij)(k) (37)
to agent i instead of the individuals shares v(ij)(k) makes it significantly harder to reconstruct the
individual x(j)(k) presupposed ∣Ni∣ ≥ 2. Consider, for example, the case of dynamically independent
subsystems without physical couplings, i.e., A(ij) = 0 whenever i ≠ j, and let Ni = {j1, . . . , j∣Ni∣}. Then,
it is easy to show that the pair⎛⎜⎜⎝
⎛⎜⎜⎝
A(i,j1) 0⋱
0 A(i,j∣Ni ∣)
⎞⎟⎟⎠ , (K(i,j1) . . . K(i,j∣Ni ∣))
⎞⎟⎟⎠
can be unobservable, which is desirable here, even if all individual pairs (A(ij),Kij)) are observable
(see [6, Sect. VII] for details).
Designing an efficient protocol that provides w(i)(k) to agent i without revealing v(ij)(k) is not
straightforward. A related problem, called private sum aggregation, has a long history of dedicated
research [86, 46, 10, 13]. Conceptually, one strategy implemented in [6] is as follows. At every time
step k, the neighbors of agent i agree upon some random shares r(ij)(k) that sum up to the zero
vector in Rmi , i.e., ∑
j∈Ni r
(ij)(k) = 0. (38)
More precisely, these shares should be in a finite field, as described in the section with secret sharing
basics. All neighboring agents then send v(ij)(k)+r(ij)(k) to agent i instead of v(ij)(k). Now, although
agent i receives ∣Ni∣ individual shares, it is impossible to reconstruct the individual v(ij)(k) since the
random shares r(ij)(k) are unknown to agent i. However, by exploiting relation (38), summing up
the received shares immediately leads to (37) and thus allows to evaluate (35). Regarding the secure
implementation, agent j computes
(⟦K(ij)⟧(i) ⊙ x(j)(k))⊕ ⟦r(ij)(k)⟧(i)
instead of (36) and submits the resulting ciphertexts to agent i. As a result, one obtains an encrypted
control scheme that still hides neighboring control strategies in terms of Kij using HE. In addition,
masking by random values is used to keep the control shares v(ij)(k) of neighboring agents secret.
Not surprisingly, the improved security comes at a price. Preserving privacy requires different
shares r(ij)(k) at every time step k. Recurrently generating these shares of zero is computationally
demanding. One solution to this problem is to contract a trusted entity (e.g., the system operator) that
generates the secret shares of zero for one (or more) time step(s) in advance and distributes them to
the agents in the network. However, mainly depending on the size of the network, the random number
generation can be very costly, both in terms of computation time and storage space. Alternatively, a
decentralized method to generate the secret shares of zero can be enforced. As discussed in [6], the
neighboring agents of an agent i then require two communication rounds to agree on suitable shares
r(ij)(k) for an upcoming time step k.
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5 Quantization effects, stability guarantees, and continuous operation
For simplicity of exposition, many technical details have been omitted during the presentation of the
various encrypted control schemes above. In this section, we point out some important details for
the correct functioning of encrypted control. First, the implementation of all presented encrypted
control schemes requires to quantize, e.g., the system states xj(k) and controller parameters (such
as Kij for the linear schemes), in order to enable encryption or secret sharing. As discussed in
the sidebar “Forming integer messages from quantized data”, the quantization is irreversible and
consequently leads to quantization errors. Carefully investigating such errors is essential since they
may destabilize an originally stable control-loop (see, e.g., [28, 44]). Hence, we illustrate quantization
effects for linear controllers and note that an analogous analysis can be carried out for the other
schemes. With quantization involved, one actually applies
uˆ(k) ∶= Kˆxˆ(k), (39)
instead of (10), where Kˆ and xˆ(k) refer to quantized parameters and states, respectively, and where
uˆ(k) denotes the resulting control action. A classical approach is to interpret the quantization-based
deviations uˆ(k) − u(k) as disturbances (see, e.g., [28, Sect. III]). Following this approach, that has
been successfully applied to the encrypted control schemes in [82, 80, 81, 3], the closed-loop dynamics
for a linear plant (11) controlled by (39) can be written as
x(k + 1) = (A +BK)x(k) +Bd(k) (40)
with the state-dependent quantization errors
d(k) ∶= Kˆxˆ(k) −Kx(k) = Kˆ (xˆ(k) −x(k)) + (Kˆ −K)x(k) (41)
that are regarded as disturbances hereafter. The dynamics (40) can now be investigated using standard
techniques from robust control. For example, under the assumption that the original control law (10)
has been designed such that A + BK is (Schur) stable, it is straightforward to certify input-to-
state stability (ISS) with respect to d (see, e.g., [45, Exmp. 3.4]). Moreover, additionally assuming
bounded disturbances d(k), robust positively invariant (RPI) sets (see, e.g., [53]) can be considered.
Interestingly, we have ∥xˆ(k) −x(k)∥∞ ≤ β−δ and ∣Kˆij −Kij ∣ ≤ β−δ
whenever ∥x(k)∥∞ ≤ βγ and ∣Kij ∣ ≤ βγ according to (15) in the sidebar “Forming integer messages
from quantized data”. Hence, bounds for d(k) as in (41) can be guaranteed and even kept arbitrarily
small by suitably designing the quantization in terms of the parameters β, γ, δ ∈ N and by restricting
the attention to states in the set Xres ∶= {x ∈ Rn ∣ ∥x(k)∥∞ ≤ βγ}. In fact, the disturbances d(k) are
then contained in the bounded set
D ∶= {d = Kˆ∆x + (Kˆ −K)x ∈ Rm ∣ ∥∆x∥∞ ≤ β−δ, x ∈ Xres } .
Now, a set R ⊂ Rn is RPI for (40) subject to the constraints x(k) ∈ Xres and d(k) ∈ D if
(A +BK)R +BD ⊆R and R ⊆ Xres, (42)
where the set-valued addition refers to a Minkowski sum. Classical results on RPI sets (as, e.g.,
collected in [53]) can now be used to investigate the closed-loop behavior of an encrypted control
scheme. For instance, it is easy to see that every state trajectory of (40) that starts in the maximal
RPI set, i.e., the largest set R satisfying (42), converges to the minimal RPI set [53, Rem. 4.1]
without leaving Xres. While the conservative interpretation of quantization errors as disturbances
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works sufficiently well for many encrypted control schemes, quantized control is an established field
of research (see, e.g., [23, 63, 44] for an overview) and more sophisticated approaches exist. Applying
these techniques could be an interesting direction for future research. However, quantization effects
are typically not the bottleneck for most existing encrypted controllers since quantization is a design-
parameter. In other words, if the original control law is stabilizing then there usually exists a suitable
quantization that preserves (robust) stability.
Depending on the nature of the cryptosystem underlying an encrypted controller, errors other
than quantization errors can occur. For example, HE schemes based on the Learning with Errors
hardness problem [71] require some noise to ensure confidentiality. Similar to the discussion above,
such noise can be interpreted as a disturbance and its effects can be bounded accordingly. For a single
encrypted operation, neither the quantization nor the noise will significantly affect the computation.
However, if the errors due to quantization or noise accumulate, undesired effects may result. Such
an accumulation appears, for example, for encrypted implementations of dynamical controllers as
in (12). In fact, iterating the encrypted controller states in the cloud usually implies an accumulation
of quantization errors and noise, which might impede a continuous and seamless operation for an
unbounded runtime. A continuous operation can be easily realized by regular “refreshments” of the
encrypted controller state through the client as, e.g., considered in [4, 78, 61]. Since a “refreshment”
usually implies decryption and re-encryption, such solutions can sometimes be costly or inconvenient.
More sophisticated schemes that ensure a continuous and seamless operation have been proposed in
[48, 18, 49, 89]. In [48], the bootstrapping technique from fully HE is used to enable the cloud to
carry out necessary refreshments on its own. However, since bootstrapping is still a very expensive
operation, [48] employs three controllers operating at the same time for the same system. In contrast,
special transformations are considered in [18, 49] to ensure that the accumulated errors stay within
certain limits. Finally, [89] designed a stabilizing quantizer for a dynamic controller encrypted with the
multiplicatively homomorphic ElGamal scheme, and [61] discussed the reset of the dynamic controller’s
state using the additively homomorphic Paillier scheme.
6 Current challenges and future research directions
We presented various encrypted control schemes in order to illustrate different controller types, suit-
able architectures, and useful cryptographic tools. Although encrypted control is a young field of
research, it is quickly emerging and the number of proposed schemes in the literature is already too
large to be comprehensively covered in such an introductory article. Nevertheless, the presented
selection illustrates two important characteristics of encrypted control. First, realizing encrypted
controllers requires in-depth knowledge of both cryptography and control theory. In fact, encrypted
control typically builds on suitable controller reformulations in combination with tailored crypto-
graphic methods. Second, guaranteeing privacy usually increases both the computation effort and the
communication load associated with networked control. This is, for example, apparent from the fact
that homomorphically encrypted ciphertexts are typically significantly longer (measured in bits) than
the corresponding plaintexts. For instance, cipthertexts resulting from the Paillier cryptosystem for
a public key with 2048 bits have 4096 bits (cf. Tab. 1 and the sidebar “Paillier encryption and its
homomorphisms”). Regarding multi-party computation, the communication load is increased since
the number of communicating parties typically growth compared to non-shared realizations.
The presented encrypted controllers also share some limitations that are common for existing
schemes but that shall be overcome by future realizations. First, partial homomorphic encryption
(such as Paillier and ElGamal) and relatively simple multi-party computations are dominating the
current generation of encrypted controllers and modern cryptosystems have not been frequently em-
ployed yet. Two exceptions to this observation are the controllers proposed in [48] and [4] that apply
(only recently published) fully respectively leveled homomorphic encryption schemes. Second, exist-
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ing encrypted controllers often rely on simplified or unrealistic setups. These simplifications include
neglected latency, costly computations at sensors and actuators, and underused clouds. Third, most
existing controllers require an “unencrypted” offline design of the scheme and privacy guarantees are
exclusively given for the online computations.
In summary, the main bottleneck of encrypted control is the high additional computational effort
and communication load. Hence, methods reducing this overload are of great interest. In this context,
more realistic setups including, e.g., communication via lossy networks with latency, would further
promote real-world applications like those in the sidebar “Prospective uses of encrypted control in
industry”. Moreover, from a control perspective, the encryption of more powerful controllers and
robust stability certificates despite quantization errors and cryptograhic noise are needed. Finally,
combining encrypted control schemes with other techniques ensuring security (see, e.g., [88]) and
safety (see, e.g., [7]) of control systems would be desirable.
The previous challenges indicate some interesting directions for future research on encrypted control.
We conclude the paper with a list of concrete problems and we thereby invite researchers to contribute
to this challenging and emerging field of research:
1. Propose encrypted implementations of more complex and nonlinear control schemes and realize
the encrypted design of controllers or its parameters.
2. Reduce the computational effort and the communication load associated with encrypted control.
Exploit, e.g., hardware acceleration and compilers for homomorphic encryption.
3. Consider quantization schemes that are not based on fixed-point numbers and further investigate
the effect of quantizations errors. Provide robust stability certificates for encrypted control
systems.
4. Implement encrypted control in real-world applications such as smart grids or vehicular networks
and verify its effectiveness. Investigate the effect of and counteract lossy communications and
latency.
5. Consider “active” attacks (i.e., malicious adversaries) and couple encrypted control with com-
plementary schemes focusing on integrity and availability of process data.
6. Ensure safety of control systems without reducing security. This is challenging since most known
techniques ensuring safe control are highly nonlinear and require access to plenty of process data.
7. Use techniques from encrypted control to secure industrial applications such as Control-as-a-
Service, smart grids, or transportation systems.
Regarding the latter challenge, we briefly note that some encrypted computations are already de-
ployed in industry. For instance, distributed systems such as blockchains make use of cryptographic
tools for coordination. In particular, privacy-preserving frameworks such as Zcash [43] utilize heavy
cryptography for performing transactions without leaking information. Furthermore, secure federated
learning by Google [1, 13] exploits private aggregation to train a model from a multitude of different
agents while reducing the amount of information collected. Such implementations focus on scalability,
speed, and coordination, and could thus serve as guidance for deploying encrypted control in practice.
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